Investors increasingly rely on proxy advisors such as ISS in deciding how to vote in corporate elections. In the paper “Information Bias in the Proxy Advisory Market,” Shichao Ma and Yan Xiong construct a theoretical model to examine the biases that can arise when the proxy advisor is a profit-maximizer. An intuitive finding is that a conflicted proxy advisor provides biased recommendations. More interestingly, if shareholders have either distorted preferences… Read More »Paper Spotlight: Information Bias in the Proxy Advisory Market

            There is widespread recognition among policymakers and regulators that bank behavior, especially risk-taking, is influenced by the type of compensation paid to bank executives. Academic literature, however, is still grappling with this question, and it is not unfair to say that there is a dearth of evidence even about basic facts about how executive compensation has changed after the 2008 financial crisis as new… Read More »Paper Spotlight: How are Bankers Paid?

The 10th MoFiR Workshop on Banking is now accepting submissions. Please see the Call for Papers. The workshop, which features a dual submission option with RCFS, will take place virtually June 21-22, 2021. The RCFS sponsoring editor is Andrew Ellul. The submission deadline is 6pm (GMT), Sunday March 21, 2021.